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ABSTRACT
The biometric system is an automatic identification and
authentication system that uses unique biological traits,
such as fingerprint, face, iris, voice, retina, etc. of an indi-
vidual. Of all these systems, fingerprint biometric system is
the most widely used because of its low cost, high matching
speed, and relatively high matching accuracy. Due to the
high efficiency of fingerprint biometric system in verifying
a legitimate user, numerous government and private orga-
nizations are using this system for security purpose. This
paper provides an overview of the fingerprint biometric
system and gives details about various current security
aspects related to the system. The security concerns that we
address include multiple attacks on the system, associated
threat models, biometric cryptosystems, current issues,
challenges, opportunities, and open problems that exist in
present day fingerprint biometric systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, passwords and tokens are in use as standard
user authentication mechanisms. However, in recent times, bio-
metric systems have ushered a new dimension to access control
systems, and are widely used as a reliable and convenient
means for user authentication. The primary purpose of using a
biometric system is to provide non-repudiable authentication
[1]. These systems have become a trusted authentication
mechanism in health-care, financial, retail, education, man-
ufacturing, military, and law enforcement agencies [2]. They
are also used in applications for the benefit of society such
as tracking child vaccination schedules, identifying missing
children, and preventing fraud in food subsidies, etc [3].
Biometric systems recognize patterns, such as veins in the
palm, the texture of an iris, or the minutiae of a fingerprint [4].
The fingerprint biometric system is a touch-based recognition
system, with comparatively small finger surface exposed to
the sensor for feature extraction and comparison, thus leading
to relatively high matching speed and accuracy with moderate
cost. Due to these advantages, it has become the most widely
used and most convenient biometric authentication system.
The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) initiated
by Government of India has so far issued more than 1110
million Aadhaar numbers the residents of India [5]. In this pro-
cess, the biometric traits such as the fingerprints are collected
from every citizen to provide them with targeted delivery
of financial and other subsidies, benefits, and services. The
Aadhaar process presents an alert to emphasize the security
aspect of the biometric system to preserve the privacy and
security of biometric traits of millions of people.
Even though biometric systems are reliable means of au-
thentication as compared to password or token based system,
it is not completely secure and have privacy concerns to worry
about. The security concerns of biometric-based application
include the risks of stolen biometrics, replacing compromised
biometrics, frauds done by administrators, denial of service,
and intrusion etc. The biometric system also has limitation
due to which it falsely accept an impostor or falsely rejects a
genuine user. The communication channel is highly insecure
leading to interception of biometric data and thus losing the
privacy of an individual. In this paper, we provide an insight
into the fingerprint biometric recognition system and address
security concerns that can be a threat to the system. We present
possible attacks on the system components and communication
channels between them, and ways to mitigate such attacks.
The organization of our paper is as follows. Section II
discusses the fingerprint biometric system briefly and its
limitations. Section III identifies fifteen vulnerable points in
the system, where the possibilities of an attack exist. Section
IV describes the attacks on the biometric system and their
countermeasures. Section V provides a glimpse of threat mod-
els available in the literature. Section VI provides an insight
into the methods used for protecting the fingerprint template,
such as cancelable biometrics and biometric cryptosystems.
This section focuses on the application of cryptography in
securing biometric system. In Section III, we present the issues
and challenges for biometric recognition system. The research
opportunities, and open problems in the biometric system
are briefly discussed in Section VIII. Section IX draws the
conclusion of the paper.
II. FINGERPRINT BIOMETRIC SYSTEM
The fingerprint biometric system is a pattern recognition
technique that recognizes a person based on a feature vector
extracted from the person’s fingerprint pattern. The steps
involved in a fingerprint biometric recognition system is shown
in Fig. 1. These systems work in two phases, namely, an
enrollment phase, and an authentication phase.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
07
11
6v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
8 M
ay
 20
18
Security Vulnerabilities Against Biometric System 2
In the enrollment phase, the system administrator performs
the registration of an individual to the biometric application.
The user puts his finger on the surface of the sensor in an input
device. A user of the fingerprint biometric system interacts
with the sensing device as he puts his finger on the sensor.
The quality of fingerprint captured by the sensor depends on
the state of the finger, such as a wet or dry finger, a cut on
the finger, the pressure applied by finger, the durability of
the sensor, etc., and environmental factors, such as humidity,
and temperature. The technologies used for manufacturing
fingerprint sensor include an optical sensor, capacitive sensor,
pressure sensor, thermal sensor, an ultrasound sensor, etc.
The image collected by the sensor is enhanced using image
enhancement module. The feature extraction module retrieves
the interesting features, shown in Fig. 2, from the fingerprint
image. The template protection module generates an encrypted
biometric template that is stored in a template database. The
administrator enrolls the user by assigning his credentials to
the captured fingerprint.
The authentication phase verifies and identifies the claimed
individual. The “verification” involves checking whether the
presented biometric belongs to the claimed person. The “iden-
tification” discloses who is associated with the submitted
biometric. In this phase, a user puts his finger on the system
and claims himself as a registered user. This attempt is termed
as a live fingerprint.
Fig. 1: Fingerprint biometric system
The interesting features of a fingerprint image are shown
in Fig. 2. The impression where the finger surface touches
the sensor forms dark lines in the image is termed as ridges,
whereas the remaining surface is called valley. The flow
pattern of ridges in a fingerprint is unique to the person in
that no two people with the same fingerprints have yet been
found [6]. The ridges on the fingerprint image form different
shapes, such as a lake (a closed ridge surrounding a valley),
the bifurcation of a single ridge, a short ridge, a dot (or an
island), bridge, crossover, etc. These complex characteristics
can be represented as a combination of two basic features, i.e.,
ridge ending and ridge bifurcation. The points at ridge ending
and ridge bifurcation form the minutia of a fingerprint [2].
An image quality checker follows the scanner in the system.
The existing fingerprint quality metrics include, segmentation-
based approaches, sum of pixels standard deviation (STD)
of local block, NIST fingerprint image quality (NFIQ) level
(1 − 5), etc. An NFIQ value of one indicates high quality
samples, whereas the NFIQ value of five indicates poor quality
samples. A good quality captured image depicts high contrast
and bright ridge structure. An image quality assessment is
performed to detect a poorly captured fingerprint. Greenberg et
al. [7] performed experiments to compare various fingerprint
image enhancement techniques and found that the techniques
based on direct gray-scale enhancement perform better than
approaches which require binarization (the process of convert-
ing a gray-scale image into a binary image) and thinning as
intermediate steps.
The enhanced image ridges are traced to create a binary
image. This binary image skeleton undergoes thinning opera-
tion to facilitate the extraction of minutia location, namely,
the points of ridge ending and ridge bifurcation. A tem-
plate normally contains only the information necessary for
comparison in the matcher module. ISO/IEC JTC1/SC37 for
standardization specifies three formats for fingerprint data
as minutia-based, pattern-based, and image-based. A minutia
template contains only the minutia information, such as,
position, type, and angle etc. A pattern template contains only
pattern related information such as ridge structure. An image
template typically stores the unmodified output of the sensor
device, such as the image of a fingerprint. The stored template
should not reveal any data that can be replayed, and it should
be difficult for an adversary to guess or reverse engineer the
original biometric trait or any close replica from the stored
data [8].
Fig. 2: Features from fingerprint image
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A stored template satisfying the following four characteris-
tics is termed as protected:
1) The stored template must be irreversible in generating
the original biometric data.
2) The matching score should not vary considerably due to
acquisition noise or environmental changes.
3) It must ensure the user’s privacy.
4) It must guarantee that the encrypted template retrieved
by the adversary from one database cannot be used for
matching in another database for the same user without
his consent.
The biometric template protection schemes aim at preserving
the user’s privacy while enhancing the security of stored
templates. Section VI presents a detailed discussion of present
day template protection schemes.
Intrinsic limitations of biometric system: The matcher mod-
ule compares the live input fingerprint template with the stored
fingerprint templates. A false match error rate or false accept
rate (FAR) specifies the percentage of cases (or the probability
with which) the system accepts an intruder (non-enrolled) user.
It is the ratio of number of attempts made by non-enrolled
users against the matching score when the system accepts
some of them as authorized user. The false non-match error
rate or false reject rate (FRR) determines the percentage of
cases (or the probability with which) the system rejects an
genuine user. It is the ratio of number of attempts made by
enrolled users against the matching score when the system
rejects some of them as unauthorized user. The predefined
decision threshold value of a biometric system is set to a
default value according to the requirement of a particular
organization. A high security application will have a higher
threshold, which means a high FRR and low FAR. A university
attendance system or a customer service facility center on the
other hand has a comparatively low threshold. The system’s
decision depends on the matching score (a numerical value)
which must be greater than or equal to a predefined threshold
for a given biometric system. High-performance fingerprint
recognition systems can support error rates in the range of
10−6 for false accept cases and 10−4 for false reject cases[9].
Fig. 3 shows the existence of a false match and a false non-
match decision as a limitation of a biometric system. For a
large number of attempts by enrolled and non-enrolled users,
the matches form a bell-shaped curve which overlap each
other. A high threshold, T2, removes all bad matches at the
cost of allowing false-non matches. If the threshold is set to
a lower value, T1, it eliminates most of the bad matches but
favors some false-matches. The equal-equal error rate (EER)
for a fixed threshold occurs when the system’s false match and
false non-match error rates are equal. Its value indicates the
probability where the FAR and FRR are same. The equal-equal
error rate is also termed as cross-over error rate. A biometric
system with lower EER will be more accurate.
III. FINGERPRINT BIOMETRIC SYSTEM : FROM SECURITY
PERSPECTIVE
Roberts identified the source of vulnerabilities for the bio-
metric system that generated out of threats. These sources
Fig. 3: Error distribution curves depicting matching scores for an
enrolled user and a non-enrolled user over a number matching
attempts.
are categorized into three types, namely, threat agent, threat
vectors and system vulnerabilities [10]. A threat agent is an
unauthorized individual who accesses the biometric system.
Thus, an attacker, an impostor, or even a legitimate user can be
a possible threat to the biometric system. All possible attacks
on the biometric system combine to form the threat vector.
We identify 16 attack points (AP) on the fingerprint bio-
metric system as shown in Fig. 4. The system components
and the insecure communication channel between these com-
ponents form the probable attack points that render the system
susceptible to numerous attacks. The possibility of attacks
is mainly attributed to the design flaws in the system. The
system components in Fig. 4 are depicted in closed boxes.
The arrow pointing from one component to another shows the
transmission of the output of one component to be fed as input
to the next component through a communication channel.
The security model in Fig. 4 is unique in several aspects
as compared to the existing threat models. We include the
template protection techniques’ module and identify the pres-
ence of an attack on it that aim to reveal the biometric key
for the cryptosystem. The successful attempts of side-channel
attacks targeting the circuit technology implementation of the
biometric system are also included in our security model.
During enrollment phase, the adversary can intercept the
secured template over the channel connecting the template
protection technique module and the database. We address
different attacks on the 16 attack points in the biometric system
in Section IV.
IV. ATTACK SCENARIOS
The fingerprint biometric system can be the target of the
system administrator, an authorized user, a layman mounting
a DoS attack on the biometric input instrument, or the bio-
metric application such as an automated teller machine, or an
adversary possessing a knowledge of the biometric system.
The scenarios involving the system administrator are termed
as insider attacks or administrative frauds.
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Fig. 4: Vulnerabilities and attacks on different components of a fingerprint biometric system. A number corresponding to an arrow or a
dashed line represents an attack point (AP).
A. Direct and Indirect Attack
The biometric attacks are broadly classified as direct attacks
(also known as presentation attacks) and indirect attacks [11].
The adversary executes direct attacks by presenting the bio-
metric characteristics of a registered user to the sensing device
to access the system as authorized user. The attacker targets
the input device or the application controlled by the biometric
system for direct attack by damaging them, rendering the
system inaccessible to such users. In Fig. 4 these attacks are
depicted as attack points, AP 1, AP 2, and AP 16. As the
sensing device is an external component of the system and is
accessible to everyone, an attacker with no knowledge of the
internals of the biometric system can mount this attack [12].
Galbally et al. performed vulnerability evaluation of finger-
print verification systems against direct attack that was carried
out with fake fingertips created from minutia templates in [13].
Further, the authors conducted direct attack experiments using
a highly competitive ISO minutia-based matcher and fake
fingers generated from ISO/IEC 19794-2 templates printed
on plastic cards as 2D barcodes in [14]. The authors used
the FVC2006 DB2 database (FVC, 2006), captured with
the optical Biometrika FX3000 sensor. The work showed
that over 75% of direct attack attempts granted access to
the system. Matsumoto et al. demonstrated that 11 different
fingerprint recognition systems accepted artificially created
gummy (gelatin) fingers [15].
The indirect attacks expect the attacker to have an expertise
in biometric systems. In order to mount an indirect attack,
the adversary must know about the internals of the targeted
system component. The person directly involved in these types
of attack can be an impostor or an authorized user. The in-
terception of information transmitted over the communication
channel, which target the internal components of the biometric
system to override its output or manipulate the stored template
are examples of indirect attacks. The attack points other than
AP 1, AP 2, and AP 16 in Fig. 4 fall under this category.
B. Repudiation
An individual can take the benefit of the intrinsic limitation
of the biometric system. The attacker can refuse to have ac-
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cessed the system by arguing the false acceptance phenomenon
associated with the system. The bank technician who withdrew
cash using the biometric application specified in Fig. 4 can
point out the possibility of false acceptance by the biometric
system.
C. Contamination or covert acquisition
The authorized user can unknowingly leave behind the
traces of his fingerprints in daily routine. The adversary
uses the fingerprint traces to generate fake fingerprint using
spoofing or constructing a mold by lifting latent fingerprint to
mount the attack. An attempt to regenerate fingerprint image
from a stolen template is also an example of such attack. The
attacker can acquire the biometric of a user from biometric
home security application and use it to dispense cash from
the biometric application in Fig. 4.
D. Coercion
The attacker can forcefully ask the authorized user to submit
his biometrics to the input device, for example, at gunpoint.
The attacker uses the biometric application with the user’s
biometric data for financial transactions. The possibility of
such incidents is high at automated teller machines having
an insecure infrastructure, no security personnel, improper
security measures like CCTV cameras.
E. Negligence
A legitimate user can hurriedly forget to log out from
the biometric application while the attacker is noticing him.
The adversary exploits such an incidence of negligence. He
continues the session pretending as an authorized user and
can carry out some more transactions or even access sensitive
information about the user
F. Insider attacks
The system administrator or the authorized person can help
in mounting an insider attack on the biometric system. The
administrator reveals the flaws in the system to the attacker,
or the legitimate user cooperates in executing such attacks.
1) Collusion: In collusion scenario, a legitimate user, such
as the system administrator with full access privileges is
the attacker. He illegally accesses and modifies the system
parameters, such as the predefined threshold. The attacker can
change the access rights of an authorized user.
2) Enrollment fraud or false enrollment: The administrator
is the authority involved in the enrollment phase. He can help
the attacker by enrolling as a legitimate user. The administrator
is satisfied with a massive bribe for the illegal enrollment for
entry into the government premises with high security.
3) Exception abuse: The exception handling procedure de-
signed to facilitate authorized users in case of emergency can
become a vulnerability to the system. The system administrator
uses this facility to help the attacker access the system as an
enrolled user. The system administrator resets the predefined
threshold to a lower value such that the adversary can take
benefit of the false match error and become authorized.
Fig. 5: Methods employed for creating artificial fingerprints [16]
4) Function creep: The administrator can collect biometric
samples of an individual whose count may exceed than that
needed to be stored for matching in the authentication phase.
The other traits along with the personal information and
government identifiers of the user like Social Security Number
in US or Aadhaar number in India, can be sold to private
organizations for financial or other malicious reasons.
The system should have multiple system administrators
with hierarchy having different levels of privileges so that an
individual authority cannot mount an insider attack, such as
collusion and exception abuse. An organization can distribute
the responsibility of enrollment to several departments to
avoid the possibility of an enrollment fraud. One department
can issue a smart-card cum identity card to every employee
whose document based verification is performed by another
department. This card can be used by a third department
(performing enrollment process) to store his biometrics on the
card itself.
G. Sensor attacks
The sensor attacks define how an attacker can grant access
to the system with manipulated biometric submission to the
sensor. The attacks on system input are specified as Type 1 in
Fig. 4. Since these attacks are carried out at the entry point of
the biometric system, the security mechanisms implemented
for digital protection, such as cryptosystems are ineffective in
such scenarios.
1) Spoofing attack: The stolen or fake fingerprint submis-
sion to a biometric system is termed as a spoofing attack. A
spoofing attack represents the presentation of false data, or
a false biometric claiming to be legitimate, in an attempt to
circumvent the biometric system controls [10]. The spoofing is
probably the easiest way for an attacker to become authorized.
To succeed, the attacker need not know about the internals of
the matching or the encryption algorithm.
Fig. 5 shows various methods that can be used for creating
artificial fingerprints. In a cooperative method, the owner of
the fingerprint is involved in the process of creation of an
artificial impression of his fingerprint. The direct mold of a
legitimate user is created using a dental impression material or
plaster. The non-cooperative methods typically create artificial
fingerprints by collecting the impressions left by the user at
different places. A powder and brush are used to create latent
fingerprints by placing it on transparent material, such as glass.
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Simple techniques, such as breathing, placing a water-filled
plastic bag, or brushing graphite powder on the sensor have
been used to reactivate latent fingerprints deposited on a sensor
[16]. The use of a dead person’s finger to create his artificial
fingerprint is termed as cadaver. The fingerprint synthesis is
a technique to recreate a fingerprint from its stored template.
The fingerprint reconstruction process can be moderated by
employing an iterative hill-climbing approach [17].
Fig. 6 shows various existing methods for fingerprint anti-
spoofing. The hardware-based solutions are costly since a new
hardware component needs to be added to the biometric sensor.
Also, this solution may add a new threat to the system, so the
software-based solutions were more emphasized rather than
a hardware-based solution. To derive dynamic features (e.g.,
ridge distortion and perspiration), multiple frames of the same
fingerprint image captured with two or five seconds interval
are analyzed. The existence of pores on finger results in
perspiration and generates an image with a darker region near
pores. The spoofed finger does not possess this phenomenon,
and thus generates almost same image over a short period.
The change in gray level between the first and last images in
a sequence can be measured by considering the local maxima
and minima of the ridge signal [16].
When a real finger is put on the sensor (multiple times in a
short span), it produces distortion in the image due to pressing
and moving the finger on the sensor surface. The distortion
can be analyzed by observing multiple frames at high frame
rate when the user presses or moves the finger. The texture
properties of a finger comprises its morphology, smoothness,
and orientation. For a spoofed finger, these properties are
different than a live finger, for instance, the live finger surface
is smoother than the spoofed one. In a static pore based
approach, the live and spoofed fingerprint can be detected
by comparing their pore quantities. The presence of pores
and locating pores on the surface is another approach used
to distinguish between spoofed and live fingerprint [18].
Feng at al. proposed an algorithm to detect altered fin-
gerprints in [19]. Distorted fingerprints have unusual ridge
patterns which are not found in natural fingerprints. Such
fingerprints include abnormal spatial distribution of singular
points or abrupt changes in orientation field along the scars
[20]. The proposed algorithm classifies the fingerprint as a
natural or altered fingerprint using a support vector machine
Fig. 6: Existing anti-spoofing approaches [16]. They are broadly
classified into hardware and software based approaches.
(SVM) by employing the features extracted from ridge orienta-
tion field. It is observed that the continuous orientation field of
a natural fingerprint is indeed continuous (i.e. no singularity)
but for an altered fingerprint, the continuous component of
the orientation field is discontinuous. The proposed algorithm
extracts a feature vector, called as curvature histogram, from
the continuous orientation field. The curvature histogram is
input to the support vector classifier to distinguish between a
natural and an altered fingerprint. The work used real (human)
and altered fingerprint in their experiments, and their proposed
algorithm could detect 92% of altered fingerprints.
2) Masquerade: A masquerade attack is a general term
given to any attempt made by the adversary pretending as a
legitimate user to access either the system or the information
and services of a registered user. The attacker in such cases
creates fake fingers, or alters the fingerprint of the authorized
user to mount a spoofing attack. The anti-spoofing approaches
discussed above can help in mitigating masquerade attack.
3) Altered fingerprint submission: Altered fingerprints are
real fingers used to conceal ones identity to evade identification
by a biometric system, e.g., using an abrasive material to
manipulate the ridges of ones finger. Yoon et al. have compiled
the case studies of altered fingerprints by an individual [20].
The authors classified the altered fingerprints as obliteration,
distortion, and imitation. An obliterate fingerprint is a result
of a cut, burn, skin disease, or side effects of drugs.
4) Obfuscation: Obfuscation can be defined as a deliberate
attempt by an individual to mask his identity from a biometric
system by altering the biometric trait prior to its acquisition
by the system e.g. mutilating the ridges of ones fingerprint by
using abrasive material [20]. The altered fingerprint submis-
sion falls into the category of obfuscation. It is not guaranteed
that an altered fingerprint will always succeed in evading the
biometric system since the number of minutia points extracted
from unaltered area before and after the mutilation are not
sufficient for a successful match in every case.
5) Fake digital biometric: The digitized latent fingerprints
can be used by the adversary to mount a masquerade attack.
The replay of a feature set to the matcher module is an example
of fake digital biometric submission attack. The adversary
can reconstruct intercepted template data to get authorized as
multiple genuine users and thus hide his own identity.
6) Fake physical biometric: The spoofing is the process of
generating fake physical finger of a legitimate user to enter
the system. The attacker fixes his target before executing the
attack to increase the chances of a successful attack. InterGov
[21] reports that insiders commit about 80 percent of all
cyber crimes (an assessment based only on reported security
breaches) [22].
7) Latent print reactivation: A latent print of the fingerprint
will be generated on the biometric sensor surface due to oil
secretion from sweat glands in the palm, or contact with the
oily or sticky material. The impressions of the fingerprint on
the sensor surface can be used by the adversary to create
readable prints. In such cases, the attacker uses the fumes
from cyanoacrylate glue or powder for reactivating the latent
fingerprint.
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H. Feature extractor attacks
The feature extraction module is responsible for identifying
minutia points from the fingerprint image generated by the
input device. The adversary can target the feature extraction
module such that it becomes incapable of generating the real
feature corresponding to the submitted fingerprint.
1) Override feature extractor: The attack on feature extrac-
tion module by the adversary involves replacing the feature
set extracted by the module with the feature set chosen by the
attacker. This is usually conducted through an attack on the
software or firmware of the biometric system [10].
2) Trojan horse attack: Fig. 7 shows a Trojan Horse attack
against the feature extraction module. It can be seen that a
Trojan attack breaks the legal process of biometric system
to override the feature extraction module. Trojan horse is a
malicious program that can be controlled remotely by the
adversary through commands. Once activated, the Trojan can
delete, copy, or modify the data from the targeted system
component. For such incidence in Fig. 4, the Trojan will
generate preprogrammed feature set to be fed as input to the
template protection techniques module.
Fig. 7: A Trojan Horse attack against the feature extraction module
[23, Chapter 7]
I. Attacks on template protection techniques module
The features extracted by the feature extraction module are
used to generate a secure digital template using cryptographic
techniques, such as, cancelable biometrics and biometric cryp-
tosystem, as mentioned in Section VI. The template protection
module responsible for performing the translation of a feature
vector into a cryptographically secured biometric template is
a potential target of the attacker. The attacker aims to extract
information related to the key used in the encryption algorithm.
The attacks on template protection techniques module are
specified as AP 6 in Fig. 4.
Side channel attacks (SCA) target a specific implementation
of a circuit on a technology platform that recover the em-
bedded secret key of the cryptosystem [24]. In these attacks,
the adversary uses the information leakage, such as power
consumption statistics, timing information, or the electromag-
netic radiation as a side channel to recover the key of the
encryption algorithm. An electromagnetic field is generated
due to the movement of electric charges. Electromagnetic side-
channel attacks exploit correlations between intermediate data
(function of the secret key) and variations in electromagnetic
emanations from tamper-resistant devices, such as smart-cards
[25]. In timing side-channel attacks, the execution time for
a cryptographic algorithm reveals the valuable information
related to the secret code involved in the computation such
as an encryption key.
J. Matcher module attacks
The matcher module in the biometric system is a hard-
ware or software component responsible for performing the
matching between the template generated from live fingerprint
and the stored template during the authentication phase. The
output of a matcher module is the similarity score between
the two templates under comparison. The adversary targeting
the matcher module aims to achieve a matching score above
the predefined threshold for a non-enrolled fingerprint. The
attacks on matcher module are specified as AP 11 in Fig. 4.
A software-based matcher executable can be digitally signed
to mitigate attack by an adversary trying to execute other
malicious code to override the output of matcher.
1) Hill climbing attack: The term hill-climbing designates
an attack in which the similarity score given by the matcher is
used to iteratively modify a synthetically generated template,
or a group of templates, until the verification threshold is
reached [26]. The goal of the hill-climbing attack is to get
authorized due to intrinsic limitation of false acceptance of the
biometric system. The set up for hill climbing attack includes
a database of artificially generated minutia templates (i.e.
fake digital biometric) and an application that submits these
templates to the matcher of the targeted biometric system. The
application collects the matching score of a submitted template
and modifies the template so that the matching score ultimately
exceeds the decision threshold to access the system. A time-out
lock-out policy that allows a specific number of unsuccessful
attempts and lock the biometric system for an random time
period can be used to mitigate hill-climbing attack.
2) Matcher override or false match: The matcher module
compares the live fingerprint template with the stored tem-
plates and preserves the score corresponding to each matching
pair. The claiming user is authenticated with the identity of
the enrolled user whose stored template match against the live
fingerprint resulted in highest score. The adversary targeting
the matcher module overrides the score generated for the
genuine template comparison with a matching score above
the predefined threshold. A matching score greater than the
threshold dispenses cash from the biometric application shown
in Fig. 4.
3) Side channel attacks: The timing analysis involves mea-
suring the time required for executing private key operations.
Galbally et al. presented a time analysis of a reference minutia-
based fingerprint matching system and studied the relationship
between the score generated by the minutiae-based NIST
Fingerprint Image Software 2 (NFIS2) and the time required
to produce the matching score [27]. The experimental result
shows a clear correlation between the score and time required
Security Vulnerabilities Against Biometric System 8
to produce the score, i.e. on average the higher a matching
score the larger is the time. Furthermore, the potential side-
channel leakages of a hardware fingerprint biometric compari-
son module was studied in [28]. The authors concluded that the
simple power consumption analysis during matching process
reveals sensitive information i.e. we can get the number of
minutia for each angle value by increasing the angle value of
the input minutia [28].
Simple power analysis (SPA) : The current flowing from the
power supply unit to the matcher module of a biometric system
can be analyzed to detect power consumption patterns that
leaks the information related to the cryptographic operations.
The sequence of executed microprocessor instructions can
be a useful information revealed by SCA. The adversary is
assumed to have knowledge about the time at which the
power consumption is correlated with the secret key. The most
common defenses against SCA include adding noise, dummy
instructions, and power consumption balancing.
Correlation power analysis (CPA) : CPA is a statistical tool
that uses Hamming distance for evaluation of cryptographic
module leakage and/or retrieve the secret data like encryption
key or minutia information in case of fingerprint biometric
system. In biometric system, it is infeasible to directly link
the output (matching core or the binary decision) with the
input (fingerprint). So, only a CPA that considers (input data,
hypothesis) pairs during the enrollment/registration phase is a
feasible way to find out the correlation between the input and
output. The vulnerability analysis of an embedded hardware
verification module (matcher used in Match-on-card systems)
against SCA by exploiting the activity leakage of the matcher
to retrieve the stored trait was presented in [29]. The authors
investigated the SCA vulnerability of the registration phase
and demonstrated how side-channel analysis by CPA to re-
trieve a reference fingerprint is feasible on a biometric matcher
module in [29]. They retrieved a part of the reference minutia
set i.e. one reference minutia per angle, in their experiment.
Differential power analysis (DPA) : Applying techniques
of differential power analysis to fingerprint matching is chal-
lenging due to the relatively large candidate space and the
linearity of matching algorithms [30]. The possibility of side-
channel attacks on fingerprint matching algorithms such as,
the Bozorth3 and a custom matching algorithm, was studied in
[30]. In [31] the authors have presented a secure co-processor
that does not leak information through the power supply. To
the best of their knowledge, the authors reported that this is
the first IC that is practically immune to DPA attacks.
SCA countermeasures : Viable cryptosystem designs must
address power analysis attacks. Masking is a commonly
proposed technique for defending against these side-channel
attacks [32]. Integrated Circuits with active shield can be
used to avoid side channel leakages. Another way to mitigate
side channel attacks is to modify the implementation of the
cryptographic algorithm such that all computations consume
same power and use equal number of clock cycles. A robust
secure fingerprint matching technique, which is secure against
side channel attacks was proposed by Yang et al. [33].
4) Trojan horse attack: The Trojan horse is a malicious
executable program that suppresses the actual matching score
output of the matcher module with the predefined score such
that the adversary can bypass all the earlier modules (stages)
in biometric system and still get authorized to access the
application. This is a tampering attack where the adversary
alters the vendor’s matching algorithm code and replaces or
modifies it with the Trojan horse code. Trojan programs can
be remotely controlled by the adversary to send commands to
the matcher module.
K. Template database attacks
The template database stores encrypted biometrics and
details of each enrolled user. The biometric system uses a
stored template and information corresponding to it to perform
the identification and verification of a user in the authentication
phase. The adversary targets the database either directly or
indirectly via an externally compromised system (if the server
is online). The primary intention of the attacker is to reuse or
tamper the stored templates. Stolen biometrics can be used to
attempt a man-in-the-middle attack, such as a replay attack.
The attacker can delete the stored templates to mount a DoS
attack. Fig. 4 represents an attack on the database as AP 8.
Li et al. have proposed a privacy protection scheme (hiding
scheme) for the thinned fingerprint template in [34]. In this
scheme, the user’s identity is hidden into thinned fingerprint
image during enrollment and such a fingerprint template is
stored in an online database for authentication. In the pro-
posed data hiding scheme, no boundary pixel is produced in
data embedding, resulting in a marked-thinned fingerprint of
visually imperceptible abnormality without compromising the
performance of the fingerprint identification [34]. The authors
claim that using such scheme, it is infeasible for the attacker to
reveal the identity of the user from stolen templates collected
from a compromised online template database.
1) Template reconstruction: The attacker breaks into the
online database where the encrypted biometrics are stored
by cracking a database account with administrative privileges
or by exploiting the vulnerability in the database software.
He modifies the existing encrypted biometrics or reconstructs
a new template from them. The modified and reconstructed
templates form the base for a replay attack. If the attacker can
tamper and modify the template information and generate a
false ID to an illegitimate person, it is termed as a template
modification attack. The adversary can use the modified bio-
metrics to mount a hill-climbing attack at AP 9 in Fig. 4. Ross
et al. demonstrated that the fingerprint reconstruction process
can be moderated by employing an iterative hill-climbing
approach [17]. The authors demonstrated that the information
about orientation field, fingerprint class information namely,
A, L, R and W , and the friction ridge structure can be
generated out of the minutiae template alone. A possible
way to mitigate the reconstruction of fingerprint from stored
template is to create templates from encrypted minutia instead
of storing minutia on template.
2) Unauthorized template modification: The attacker can
target the online database from an externally compromised,
hacked system through a known or unknown bug in the
database software, log information on the disk, or information
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in cache or primary memory. Such an attempt is difficult
to trace since the compromised system is mostly a hacked
computer under the control of the attacker. The adversary can
steal the minutia templates to execute a replay attack. He can
even delete and substitute the minutia templates to mount a
DoS attack for the genuine users.
3) Circumvention: The adversary controlling the applica-
tion secured with the biometric system is said to be attempting
circumvention. The circumvention threat can be cast as a
privacy attack, where the attacker obtains the unauthorized
data (for example, accessing the medical records of another
user) or, as a subversive attack, where the attacker manipulates
the system (for example, changing those records, submitting
bogus insurance claims, etc.) [35]. The adversary gets himself
authorized by attempting any attack, such as spoofing, replay,
administrative frauds etc., to access the application and then
mounts circumvention on the application data.
L. Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack
In a typical scenario of a man-in-the-middle attack on the
biometric system, the attacker intercepts the communication
channel to collect the biometric data of a legitimate user. The
attacker, in this case, can target AP 3, AP 5, AP 7, AP 9, AP
10, and AP 12 from Fig. 4 on the biometric system. These
attacks are similar to replay attacks, where the attacker listens
to the communication channel for capturing biometric data and
then alters this data to access the system as a legitimate user.
1) Replay attack: In the replay attack (also known as false
data injection attack), an attacker bypasses the scanner and
uses the previously generated digital image of a legitimate user
to access the system. The attacker injects the false intercepted
data directly into the communication channel to the matching
component. Here, the attacker intercepts the communication
medium between the sensor and the matching component,
then alters the contents (to access the system as more than
one genuine user), and then retransmits to the matcher for
processing. This is a type of the man-in-the-middle attack
represented as AP 5 in Fig. 4 which requires the attacker
to have good knowledge of the system and database. In
data injection attack, the biometric system and the template
database are compromised.
A challenge/response method to mitigate a replay attack
considers every attempt involving all modules of the biometric
system to authorize a user as a single transaction. It assumes
that the sensor is intelligent enough to respond to a query by
a secured transaction server. Whenever the sensor is touched
with a user finger, the transaction server sends a query, e.g.
a random pixel value, to the sensor. If the image received by
the feature extractor has the same pixel value as responded by
the sensor then the transaction continues otherwise an attempt
of bypassing the sensor and thus an attack is detected and the
transaction is aborted.
2) Reuse of residuals: The biometric system can hold the
retrieved digital template in its primary memory for some
time after performing the matching operation. The adversary
can use the biometrics available in main memory to access
the system as a legitimate user. The adversary replays the
biometric templates to mount reuse of residual attack at AP
5 in Fig. 4. The memory holding the data for matching can
be reserved and flushed immediately after a claiming user is
either rejected or accepted by the system to avoid reuse of
residual by the adversary.
3) System parameter override or modification: The attacker
manipulates the system parameters to widen the range of
false acceptance and subsequently shorten the false reject
margin. As a result of such alteration of system parameters
(especially FAR/FRR parameters), the adversary creates a path
to access the application in Fig. 4 with poor quality fingerprint
images or incorrect data. The code signing technique can
detect any tampering or alteration in the code, thus mitigating
such attacks. Protection of software code against illegitimate
modifications are discussed in [36] and [37].
4) Synthesized feature vector: The adversary with a knowl-
edge of the biometric system can create a biometric template
outside the system and directly inject it into the data stream of
the communication channel. The hill-climbing attack can use
this synthesized template at AP 9 in Fig. 4. The challenge-
response technique can help in detecting an attack involving
a synthesized feature vector.
5) Brute force attack: A brute force attack on the biometric
system involves submitting a large number of fingerprints to
the system. Brute force attack is mounted at AP 4 in Fig. 4.
The attacker must maintain a real fingerprint template database
of large number of entries in order to execute the brute force
attack efficiently. The work of Ratha et al. in [38] gives
the relation between the matches that occurred for various
attempts of brute force attack. A dictionary-based guessing
attack is a sophisticated brute force attack. Here, the attacker
chooses only those fingerprints that have a high probability of
matching. The average number of attempts needed by a brute-
force attack can be derived from the FAR of the system [39].
A 0.001% FAR indicates that 1 out of 100,000 brute force
attacks on an average will be successful [40].
6) Storage channel intercept and data inject: The com-
munication channel between the encrypted biometric template
database with other components, namely, the template protec-
tion techniques module and the matcher, can be the source of
information for the adversary. The attacker may inject false
data directly into the data stream connected to the database.
Such a threat is shown as AP 7 and AP 10 in Fig. 4. The data
transmitted over the communication channel can be encrypted
to avoid interception.
7) Modify score: The adversary can ease the process of
authentication by modifying the matching score intercepted
between the channel connecting the matcher and the decision
module. He overrides the actual score with a high score above
the threshold. Fig. 4 represents such a threat as AP 12. A
mutual authentication between matcher and decision module,
like a challenge-response technique, can be used to detect a
modified score.
M. Modify access rights
The administrator enrolls users having different privileges
or access rights in the biometric controlled application. If
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the adversary diminishes the rights of a high privileged user,
then it leads to a denial of service attack to such users.
The system is under threat when a user registered with low
access rights suddenly gets administrative rights. In either case,
the adversary initially needs to gain the system administrator
credentials.
N. Decision override
The decision module accepts or rejects a user as enrolled
and authorized based on the comparison between the matching
score and the predefined score. The attacker can use a Trojan
horse to override the decision module to give the result in
his favor. For example, such an attack can be used by the
adversary to grant access to the application in Fig. 4 or deny
all other users from using the application.
O. Denial-of-service (DoS) attack
The DoS attack renders the system inaccessible to the
authorized users. For a biometric authentication system, an
online authentication server that processes access requests (via
retrieving templates from a database and performing matching
with the transferred biometric data) can be bombarded with
many bogus access requests to a point, where the server’s
computational resources cannot handle valid requests any more
[35]. These attacks are generally detected in a small time
duration. In some cases, however, the intent is to have the
attack noticed in order to create confusion and alarm and force
the activation of alternative or exception handling procedures
[10]. The organization can use CCTV cameras, tampering
alarms, or personal security guards to protect a biometric
system controlled application, such as a cash dispenser shown
in Fig.III.
P. Intrusion
In intrusion attack, the attacker breaks into the template
storage through an external system. The scenario where the
system recognizes an impostor as an authorized user is also
a case of intrusion. The server hardening (i.e. enhancing the
server security against all possible vulnerabilities), database
access controls, signing stored templates, storing encrypted
templates and use of Match-on-Card technology can be the
possible countermeasures against intrusion attack.
Q. Zero-effort attacks
The zero-effort attack is a benefit an adversary receives, and
the trouble an enrolled user faces due to system limitations. It
is an incorrect authentication (a non-enrolled user is authenti-
cated due to false match error) and rejection (an enrolled user
is rejected due to false non-match error) scenario. This attack
is the result of shifting the predefined threshold to lower or
higher value. Fig. 4 shows this scenario as AP 14 and AP
15. The existence of zero-effort attack is due to the limited
individuality and intraclass variations in biometric features and
efforts are underway by the research community to reduce
such intrinsic errors by designing salient-feature detectors and
robust matchers [8].
An on-line platform, EvaBio, for the security evaluation of
biometric systems was presented in [41], which implements a
quantitative-based security assessment method to allow easily
the evaluation and comparison of biometric systems. In order
to quantify a newly developed biometric system, the authors
also provided a database of common vulnerabilities and threats
of a biometric system.
V. THREAT MODELS
In this Section, we present threat models that exist for
a fingerprint biometric system. A threat model is a way to
identify various possibilities of attacks (or the potential threats)
on a system in the computational powers of an adversary. We
present four threat models that exist in the literature which
point out different attacks and vulnerabilities in the biometric
system.
A. Ratha et al. model
The Ratha et al. model shown in Fig. 8 is the first threat
model proposed for a fingerprint biometric system. It identifies
eight vulnerabilities based on the access point of information
in a biometric system [9]. These vulnerabilities lead to a
specific type of attack, represented as Type 1 to Type 8, on
the system components. The countermeasures for all 8 types
of attacks from this model are discussed in Section IV.
Type 1 attack : According to the model, sensors are suscep-
tible to spoofing, false biometric submission or residual attack
represented as Type 1 attacks. These attacks are basically
a fake biometric presentation at the sensor. The adversary
collects the biometrics of a genuine user and creates fake
physical finger to access the system.
Type 2 attack : The interception of communication channel
between sensor and feature extractor by the adversary forms
the base for Type 2 attack. The adversary replays a previously
intercepted digitized biometric signal bypassing the sensor.
Masquerading is a Type 2 attack.
Fig. 8: Ratha et al. model [9] : The dashed arrows indicate the access
point of information for mounting a specific type of attack
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TABLE I: Biometric system attack summary with reference to Fig. 4. AP stands for Attack Point.
AP Targeted component Possible attack Countermeasures References
1 Biometric input device Adversary attacks andadministrative frauds
Liveness detection,
Challenge/response
[42], [14], [43],
[16], [19]
2 Biometric input device Denial of service Rugged devices [10], [44]
3 Communication channel between sensorand feature extraction module Fingerprint image intercept
Transmit data over
encrypted path/secure channel [44]
4 Feature extraction module Trojan horse attack,Override feature extractor Code signing [44]
5 Communication channel between feature extractionmodule and template protection techniques module Replay attack
Challenge-response
based system,
disposable Feature Extractors (FE)
[10], [45]
6 Template protection techniques module Side channel attacks Masking, designing ICswith active shield [30], [31]
7 Communication channel between template protectiontechniques module and template database
Template intercept,
data inject
Use strong tested
biometric algorithms [46]
8 Template database Steal, delete, modify,substitute template
Hardened server,
DB access controls,
sign templates,
store encrypted templates,
store template on card
[8], [22], [47]
9 Communication channel between template protectiontechniques module and matcher module
Hill-climbing attack,
brute force attack Time out/lock out policies [39], [48]
10 Communication channel between template databaseand matcher module Replay attack
Utilize Timestamps or
Time to Live (TTL) tag [10]
11 Matcher module Side channel attack,Trojan horse attack
Masking, designing ICs
with active shield,
Code signing
[30], [33]
12 Communication channel between matcher module anddecision module Modify score
Mutual authentication between
matcher and decision module [44]
13 Decision module Override decision Code signing [10]
14 Communication channel between decision module andbiometric application
Zero-effort attack
(false match error) Design robust matcher [48], [49]
15 Communication channel between decision module andbiometric application
Zero-effort attack
(false nonmatch error) Design robust matcher [49]
16 Biometric application (e.g. cash dispenser) Denial of service CCTV monitoring,deploy security guards [44], [10]
Type 3 attack : The attacker can override the feature
extraction module to mount a Type 3 attack. The adversary
copies a Trojan horse executable at the feature extraction
module. Generally, Trojan horses can be controlled remotely.
The adversary sends commands to the Trojan horse to send
the feature set selected by him.
Type 4 attack : The communication channel between the
feature extractor and the matcher can be targeted by the
attacker. The adversary intercepts the features transmitted over
the communication channel and replays it after a time gap. The
previously intercepted and tampered/modified feature sets can
be directly transmitted to the matcher bypassing the feature
extractor module.
Type 5 attack : The threat to the matcher module overriding
the matching score using a Trojan horse is a Type 5 attack.
In this attack, the adversary sends commands remotely to
generate a high matching score and send positive response (e.g.
a “Yes” or “Accept”) to the biometric controlled application
and bypass the authentication process completely. He can even
mount a denial-of-service attack by giving a command to
indefinitely generate a low matching score.
Type 6 attack : The intruder can explore ways for template
database leakage with Type 6 attack. The adversary not only
collects the leaked stored templates but also replays them and
modifies them to get authorized on behalf of different enrolled
users.
Type 7 attack : In Type 7 attack scenario, the adversary
intercepts the communication channel between the template
database and the matcher module to collect templates from
the data stream. These intercepted templates can be directly
replayed or altered and then replayed at the matcher module
to access the system with the identity of different users.
Type 8 attack : The adversary can bypass all system com-
ponents and directly manipulate the system decision in his
favor in Type 8 attack. An attack to override the final decision
of the biometric system in favor of the adversary nullifies
the excellent performance characteristics of the biometric
application.
B. The fishbone model
Fig. 9 shows the fishbone (cause and effect) model pro-
posed by Jain et al. in [44]. The model depicts the causes
that determine the vulnerability of a biometric system. The
authors identified five causes that lead to vulnerabilities in the
biometric system represented in ovals in Fig. 9. The arrows
specify the effects i.e. the possible attacks due to these causes.
Intrinsic failure involves the system limitations and errors
responsible for false acceptance of a non-enrolled individual
or false rejection of an enrolled user. The intra-user variations
causes large variations in the live and stored features of the
enrolled user leading to false rejection. This error can be
due to improper or partial finger put at the sensor. The lack
of individuality or uniqueness (mostly among twins in face
recognition system) can result in large similarity between
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the feature sets of two different individual leading to false
rejection.
Administration cause describe the ways in which a dishonest
staff, such as, a system administrator can play the role of an
adversary. A disloyal administrator can assist an adversary in
either mounting a successful attack, or induce an enrollment
fraud or exception abuse. The exception processing is a way
for the enrolled user to get authorized in case if the biometric
system rejects him due to intrinsic limitation or denial of
service attack (by deleting his stored template). The insider
attacks include the cooperation an adversary receives from the
disloyal staff to mount an attack on the system.
Infrastructure causes include system design defects that
make the system susceptible to adversary attacks. The hard-
ware components such as sensor, the software implemented
at the feature extraction module and matcher module along
with the communication channel between various system
components forms the infrastructure of the biometric system.
A Trojan horse program can be used by the adversary to
override the matcher or decision module.
Non-secure processing causes point out the vulnerabilities
due to insecure enrollment and authentication process. The
adversary can mount a hill-climbing or replay attack through
the non-secure communication channel to intercept the infor-
mation and get authorized by skipping the sensor. The poorly
secured database can leak the stored templates. The adversary
uses the templates thus collected to mount a replay attack.
A function creep is a phenomenon of cross-matching the
biometric features of an enrolled user. The adversary collects
the biometrics of a user either through database leakage or
communication channel intercept from his employer’s system
and uses it in other applications like banking services, passport
services etc.
Patent cause or biometric overtness is related to the secrecy
of biometric templates. The attacker covertly collects the
biometrics of a genuine user from the sensor or public places
visited by the user. These biometrics can be used to create
fake physical or gummy finger to mount a spoofing attack.
This model highlights the general errors that should be
avoided and the security techniques to be implemented while
designing a biometric system. The authors suggest that the
Fig. 9: Fishbone model [44]. The blocks denote the processing phases
of a biometric system that are vulnerable targets in this model. The
possible attacks are mentioned on the arrows.
Fig. 10: Nagar et al. model [44]
most straightforward way for securing the biometric system
is to store the template and the system modules (components)
on smart cards. Such systems are called as system-on-card or
match-on-card.
C. The Nagar et al. model
Fig. 10 shows Nagar et al. model. This model is based
on the Fishbone model in terms of specifying causes for
vulnerabilities and their effects on a biometric system. The text
besides the dotted ovals in Fig. 10 specify a given cause and
the contents of the ovals shows the possible attacks as an effect
of these causes. The four large rectangles in Fig. 10 shows
the major constituents of a biometric-based authentication
application.
The non-secure infrastructure can leak sensitive information
to the adversary through communication channel. The system
components, such as feature extraction module or the matcher
module are also vulnerable to Trojan attack which overrides
the real output of these elements. The authors combined non-
secure processing causes (arising due to insecure enrollment
and authentication process) and infrastructure causes (respon-
sible for denial of service attack) from Fishbone model into a
single non-secure infrastructure cause in this model.
Overtness of biometric includes the attacks that use the overt
information about the biometrics of an individual, such as,
our face, fingerprint left at public places, our voice over a
conversation etc. The attack involving overtness of biometric
include coercion, collusion, and spoofing attacks targeted by
the adversary at a biometric input device.
Intrinsic failure includes the system limitations responsible
for false acceptance of a non-registered user. The predefined
threshold decides the authenticity of a claiming user. For a
high security application, like entry into military zone, the
threshold is fixed to a higher value which sometime may
reject a soldier due to improper touch of his finger to the
sensor or environmental factors. For a university attendance
system, a student not registered for a particular course can
mark proxy attendance for a registered student due to lower
threshold value.
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Fig. 11: Bartlow and Cukic framework : AP represents an Attack Point. The biometric system is divided into three modules, namely,
administrative observation/system management module, IT environment module and biometric subsystem module. The biometric subsystem
module is divided into five subsystem, namely, data collection, signal processing, decision, transmission and storage subsystem.
A system administrator may exploit administrative loop-
holes to misuse his administrative rights. As discussed in
Section IV, the administrator can support the adversary in col-
lusion, enrollment fraud or spoofing. The best countermeasure
against the attacks involving internal staff with administrative
privileges is to appoint multiple system administrators for
every superuser task.
D. Bartlow and Cukic framework
Wayman proposed to classify a biometric system as a
composition of five primary subsystems depending on its
application, namely, data collection, transmission, signal pro-
cessing (which includes feature extraction, quality control,
pattern matching), storage, and decision [50]. Fig. 11 shows
the Bartlow and Cukic framework [51], [10] as an extension
of Ratha et al. model and Wayman’s subsystem architecture,
which mainly focus on technical testing of biometric devices.
The authors decomposed the model into three modules and
identified more than twenty vulnerable attack points. The three
modules (shown in dark gray color in Fig. 11) are namely
administrative observation/system management module, IT
environment module, and the biometric subsystem module.
The biometric subsystem (i.e. the system management module)
is further categorized into five subsystems (shown in large
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ovals in Fig. 11) according to Wayman’s suggestion. The
arrows represent the point of attacks and vulnerabilities in the
subsystems and various modules in the system.
In Fig. 11, the administrative observation/system manage-
ment module represents disloyal system administrators and the
arrow originating from it shows the possible attack points by
such staff targeting different components. Attack points AP 1
and AP 2 target the data collection module of biometric sub-
system where the adversary seeks help from the administrator.
Attack points AP 18 and AP 20 specify the manipulation of
final decision by the administrator in favor of the adversary.
The bad administrator can perform false enrollment through
AP 19.
The IT environment subsystem includes other applications,
such as operating system and database management system
that directly or indirectly interact with the biometric system.
The attack point AP 3 shows the possibility of an attack
through these interacting applications. There is a possibility of
intrusion or malicious code execution with the help of these
applications.
The biometric subsystem specifies the internal components
of the biometric system, the data transmission between them,
and the targeted vulnerable points. In the data collection mod-
ule, the collection and presentation of biometrics is performed.
The attack points, AP 4, AP 5, and AP 6 are vulnerable
to attacks carried out through the input devices. The spoof-
ing, replay, and masquerade attacks can be mounted on this
module. The compression and transmission of biometric data
is represented with transmission module which is susceptible
to attacks, such as replay, parallel sessions, and masquerade
shown by attack points, AP 7, AP 8, AP 9, AP 10, and AP 11
in Fig. 11. In this attack mode, the adversary intercepting over
the communication channel collects the information required
to mount replay, hill-climbing, or brute force attack. The signal
processing module comprises the robust feature extraction,
template matching, and image quality control components. The
adversary uses a Trojan at AP 12 and AP 14 to target the
feature extractor and the quality control unit, respectively. The
attacker can even use a poor quality image at AP 13 to mount
a hill-climbing attack, or execute a brute force attack. Using
the hill-climbing attack, the attacker can construct a fingerprint
image using the responses (i.e. score) of matcher module until
an acceptable score is achieved. In another scenario, he can
apply image processing techniques to generate multiple copies
of the poor quality image by enhancing the ridges and use all
these images to mount a brute force attack. The interception
of information between the pattern matching module and the
decision module is shown in AP 15. The process of capturing
data through database leakage and retransmitting it again to
the matcher module is done at attack points, AP 16 and AP
17, respectively. The attempt to override the final conclusion
of the decision module in cooperation with a bad administrator
is represented with AP 20.
The details about potential vulnerable attack points is given
in this model, but it does not propose the methodology to
design security techniques for a biometric system. So, this
model can be used only as a benchmark to test and validate
existing and proposed security techniques.
VI. TEMPLATE PROTECTION SCHEMES
A template represents a set of salient features, such as
minutia, that summarizes the biometric data (signal) of an
individual [47]. The stored template should not reveal any data
that can be replayed and it should be difficult for an adversary
to guess or reverse engineer the original biometric trait or any
close replica from the stored data [8]. The biometric template
protection schemes aim at preserving the user’s privacy while
enhancing the security of stored templates.
ISO/IEC 24745 [52] standard specifies three mandatory
requirements for all biometric template protection schemes,
namely, non-invertability, revocability, and unlinkability. Non-
invertability property requires that given a protected biometric
template, it should be computationally infeasible to obtain
the original template. Revocability property requires that, it
should be computationally difficult to obtain the original
biometric template from multiple instances of protected bio-
metric reference derived from the same biometric trait of
an individual [53]. Non-linkability property assures that, it
is computationally difficult to ascertain whether two or more
instances of protected biometric reference were derived from
the same biometric traits of a user [53].
Fig. 12 shows various template protection schemes adapted
from [54]. Biometric templates storing minutia information
(without encryption) are vulnerable to tampering attack and
replay attack. The templates can be secured at the database (by
avoiding leakage), over the communication channel (by using
encryption techniques), and also at the matcher (by concealing
any information related to secret data, such as encryption key,
through data-dependent variations in power consumption or
computation time). The schemes to protect biometric templates
can be broadly categorized into three levels, namely, hardware
level, software level, and biometrics in encrypted domain.
A. Hardware level schemes
Hardware level protection to templates is performed during
transmission and in the database to avoid interception and
tampering of templates. A tamper-proof hardware disallows an
attacker from breaking into the hardware components, such as
matcher, to steal a secret (such as, an encryption key), and thus
prevent unauthorized access. Smart-card assisted hardware,
such as System-on-Card and Match-on-Card, can help in
mitigating such attacks on biometric templates. Since these
systems embeds the biometric system and a user template on
the card itself, it lowers the probability of template interception
and leakage from database as compared to online database.
The trusted platform module (TPM) was developed by Trusted
Computing Group (TCG) as platform that includes additional
hardware and software to increase the security level of IT-
systems [55]. A Trusted Platform is “a computing platform
that has a trusted component, probably in the form of built-in
hardware, which it uses to create a foundation of trust for
software processes” [56]. TPM secures a hardware (i.e., a
cryptoprocessor) using an integrated cryptographic key. TPM
can be used for hardware level tamper detection and also
for hardware-based authentication. There are increased use
of TPM chips in certain dedicated security applications, such
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TABLE II: Comparison of Threat Models
Threat model Underlying criteria Classification Application
Ratha et al. model Access point ofinformation
8 vulnerable points resulting
in 8 types of attacks
A general model without
details of specific attacks
Fishbone model cause and effect 5 causes leading tobiometric system failure
Useful while designing
biometric security techniques
Nagar et al. model Cause and effect similarto Fishbone model
Major vulnerabilities and
their 4 underlying causes
Specifies the vulnerabilities for
biometric-based authentication system
Bartlow and Cukic
framework
Wayman’s subsystem
architecture [50]
3 modules with
20 potential attack points
Well suited for testing
and validating secure techniques
Fig. 12: Template protection schemes
as Microsoft BitLocker, storage of public key infrastructure
(PKI), private keys, and other credentials (e.g., biometric iden-
tifiers), and potentially secure machine identities on sensitive
networks [57].
B. Software level schemes
The software level schemes mainly concentrate on the ways
to make sure that the biometrics stored on the templates
is encrypted (using key) and it is practically infeasible to
divulge the secret encryption key or regenerate the original
fingerprints of a user. These schemes include cryptosystems
(using encryption key to secure template), template genera-
tion using feature transformations (such as, salting and non-
invertible transforms), and transformation of template image
(e.g. steganography).
1) Cryptosystems: Biometric cryptosystems provide the
benefits of cryptography and biometrics to an application.
They protect the application using high and adjustable security
levels provided by cryptographic techniques using a secret key,
and ensures trust using non-repudiation through biometrics.
The biometric cryptosystems can be designed in two ways.
It can either use the biometrics of an individual to generate a
digital key, or securely bind a secret key to the user biometrics.
Biometrics-based “key-release” refers to the use of biometric
authentication to release a previously stored cryptographic key,
whereas biometrics-based “key generation” refers to extract-
ing/generating a cryptographic key from a biometric template
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or construct [58]. These techniques are discussed in detail in
the following paragraphs of this Section.
The majority of cryptosystems require the storage of bio-
metric dependent public information, which is applied to re-
trieve or generate keys; such biometric dependent information
is referred to as helper data [44]. Uludag et al. [59] stated that
two contradicting requirements arise,
1) helper data should contain sufficient information to
allow an alignment between a query and a template, and
2) helper data should not leak critical information about the
template.
The authors proposed a scheme for generating orientation-field
based helper data in the fuzzy fingerprint vault framework,
which does not leak minutiae information, yet it enables us to
properly align the input query.
Key-binding scheme: In biometric-based key binding
schemes, the cryptographic key is tightly bound with the
biometric template so that it cannot be released without a
successful biometric authentication without accessing template
directly [60]. The transformed characteristic of the legitimate
user is compact in the feature space, and the characteristic
of a fake identity is either dispersed or far away from the
legitimate user’s characteristic. This variation distinguishes
the transformed characteristic of the registered user from the
characteristic of the false identity.
Fig. 13: Basic concept of biometric key-binding [61].
Fig. 13 shows the basic concept behind the key-binding
scheme. In this method, the key is combined with a biometric
sample to generate helper data during the enrollment. A new
biometric sample along with the stored helper data are used
to release the same key during the authentication [62]. In this
scheme, it is computationally infeasible to retrieve the original
biometric template or the secret key given only the helper data.
Biometric Encryption (BE) is a group of emerging tech-
nologies that securely binds a digital key to a biometric or
generates a digital key from the biometric so that no biometric
image or template needs to be stored [63]. In biometric
encryption, a password-based encryption key is used to encrypt
the template during the enrollment phase. The most distinct BE
technologies are the following: Mytec1 [64] and Mytec2 [65],
[66], ECC check bits [67], biometrically hardened passwords
[68], the fuzzy commitment scheme [69] and some of its
generalizations in the fuzzy extractor/secure sketch framework
[70], shielding functions (i.e., quantization using correction
vector) [60], fuzzy vault [71], PinSketch [72], and BioHashing
[73] with key binding [74].
Biometric EncryptionTM, an algorithm for linking and re-
trieval of digital keys, which can be used as a method for the
secure management of cryptographic keys was proposed by
Soutar et al. in [75, Chapter 22]. This algorithm works on the
complete fingerprint image and is based on the mechanism
of correlation. The algorithm independently generates the
cryptographic key which can be periodically updated using
a re-enrollment procedure.
During enrollment, the Biometric EncryptionTM process
combines the biometric image with a digital key (used as a
cryptographic key) to create a secure block of data, known
as a BioscryptTM [75, Chapter 22]. Mytec Technologies Inc.
claim that it is infeasible to obtain either the fingerprint or the
key independently from Bioscrypt TM. The algorithm combines
the biometric image and the BioscryptTM to retrieve the key
during verification.
In the enrollment process, a set of input fingerprint images
undergo image processing with a random (phase) array and
generate two new arrays as output, namely, Hstored(u) which
is stored in BioscryptTM and c0(x). The proprietary link
algorithm performs linking of cryptographic key k0 and c0(x).
Finally, the key k0 is used to create an identification code id0.
During verification process, the Hstored(u) undergoes image
processing with a new set of input (claim) fingerprint images
to produce an output pattern c1(x). The proprietary retrieval
algorithm accepts c1(x) as input to extract a key k1. A new
identification code id1 is generated from k1. In the end, the
key validation is performed by comparing id0 and id1.
Fuzzy commitment A fuzzy commitment scheme (FCS)
processes a binary biometric enrollment sequence (i.e. a bina-
rized fingerprint image) XN = {x1, x2, ..., xN} with symbols,
xi ∈ {0, 1} for i = {1, 2, ..., N}, and a binary biometric
authentication sequence Y N = {y1, y2, . . . , yN} with symbols
yi ∈ {0, 1} for i = {1, 2, ..., N}, where the sequences are
generated by a biometric source according to some distribution
{Q(xN , yN ) , xN ∈ {0, 1}N , yN ∈ {0, 1}N} [69]. Fig. 14
shows the fuzzy commitment scheme. In this scheme, a secret
s ∈ {0, 1, ..., |S|} is independent of biometric data and chosen
uniformly at random. So,
Pr{S = s} = 1/|S|, ∀ s ∈ {0, 1, ..., |S|} (1)
Fig. 14: Fuzzy commitment scheme [69]
In the enrollment phase, the secret s is fed to the encoder to
generate an encoded binary codeword CN = ( c1, c2, ..., cN )
such that ci ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i = 1, 2, ..., N . The binary biometric
enrollment sequence XN is added (modulo 2) to the generated
codeword to produce a sequence ZN = ( z1, z2, ..., zN ) , such
that zi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ i = 1, 2, ..., N . Thus
ZN = CN ⊕XN = e( s) ⊕XN (2)
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where, CN = e( s) and e( ·) represents the encoding func-
tion. The public sequence ZN released to the authentication
side is referred to as the helper data.
In the authentication, a binary biometric authentication
sequence Y N is added (modulo 2) to the helper data ZN
received from enrollment. This addition results in the sequence
RN .
RN = ZN ⊕ Y N = e( s) ⊕XN ⊕ Y N (3)
where, RN = ( r1, r2, ..., rN ) , such that ri ∈ {0, 1}, ∀
i = 1, 2, ..., N . Thus, we can consider RN as a codeword
CN with some additional noise sequence, i.e., XN ⊕ Y N . A
decoder accepts RN as input to determine the estimate sˆ as
sˆ = d(RN ) = d( e( s) ⊕ (XN ⊕ Y N ) ) (4)
where, d( ·) represents the decoding function.
Like a conventional cryptographic commitment scheme, the
fuzzy commitment scheme is both concealing and binding:
it is infeasible for an attacker to learn the committed value,
and also for the committer to decommit a value in more than
one way [76]. Lafkih et al. [77] proposed a security analysis
framework based on several scenarios of threats that can affect
biometric cryptosystems and applied this analysis on FCS and
determined theoretically and practically that cryptosystems
based on FCS do not ensure a high level of security or
protection of privacy.
A fuzzy vault scheme [71], is an order invariant crypto-
graphic construction in the form of an error-tolerant encryption
operation where keys consist of sets. It is an extension of the
fuzzy commitment scheme. Suppose, Alice possess a secret
encryption key k and an unordered set A. She places k in a
vault and locks using A. If Bob possess another unordered set
B, then he can unlock the vault to access k if and only if B
largely overlaps A.
You et al. [78] defined the fuzzy vault scheme also called as
fingerprint vault scheme as follows. In this scheme, initially
every extracted minutia is converted into an element mi in
a finite field F. The selected secret key k is encoded to a
polynomial f (x) ∈ F [X], which is evaluated in each mi.
All the points (mi, f (mi)) and some stochastic camouflage
points ci, di are selected, such that di 6= f (ci) are to be stored
together as a vault V .
The security of this scheme is based on the infeasibility
of the polynomial reconstruction problem. The fuzzy vault
scheme is an example of the biometric-based key generation.
This scheme possesses characteristics that make it suitable
for applications that combine biometric authentication and
cryptography; the advantages of cryptography (e.g., proven
security) and fingerprint-based authentication (e.g., user con-
venience, non-repudiation) can be utilized in such systems
[79]. Nagar et al. have shown that both performance and
security of a fingerprint fuzzy vault can be improved by
incorporating minutiae descriptors, which capture orientation
and ridge frequency information in a minutia’s neighborhood
in [80].
Shielding function Shielding functions are proposed to en-
hance privacy and prevent misuse of biometric templates in
key binding schemes. These function aim to enhance the
reliability and reproducibility of the detection and to shield
the information (or ‘entropy’) in the secret from the reference
data [60].
Fig. 15: Shielding functions: basic operation mode [61]
Fig. 15 shows the basic operation mode of shielding
function. A fixed length, real-valued, noise free biometric
feature vector X is assumed at the enrollment. A secret
S (the key) together with X is applied to an inverse δ-
contracting function G−1 to generate the helper data W , such
that G (W,X) = S. A hash of the secret S is stored (as
a template) additionally as F (S) = V . The δ-contracting
function G that computes a residual for each feature is the
core of this scheme. W comprises all residuals that form a
correction vector. During authentication phase, a new feature
vector Y is used to compute G (W,Y ). If ||X − Y || ≤ δ,
then G (W,Y ) = S′ = S = G (W,X). Finally, the hash
value F (S) of the reconstructed secret S is tested against the
previously stored one (V ) yielding successful authentication
or rejection [61].
Key-generation scheme: Fig. 16 shows the basic concept
behind the key generation scheme. Key generation techniques
extract a cryptographic key from a biometric sample during
the enrollment (along with the helper data, if necessary) and
the same key has to be extracted using a new biometric sample
(and the helper data when available) during authentication
[62].
Fig. 16: Basic concept of biometric key-generation [61]
Quantization The idea of quantization is to quantize each
component of the feature vector with a threshold to tolerate
the noise [81]. The best way to protect the user biometrics is
to ensure that the information on the template is incompre-
hensible and irreversible. Hash functions are generally used
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for such purposes. A hash function is extremely sensitive to
input value; the biometric samples from the same user are
never exactly the same hence the feature vectors don’t match
exactly. As a result, the hash function can not be directly
used to protect biometric templates. The adaptive non-uniform
quantization algorithm maps different noisy feature vectors
from one biometric sample to a unique vector and then protect
it by cryptographic hash functions, such as MD5.
Secure sketch and Fuzzy extractor Secure sketches and
extractors can be viewed as providing fuzzy key storage; they
allow recovery of the secret key (w or R) from a faulty reading
w′ of the password w by using some public information (s
or P ) [70]. The secure sketch scheme consists of two main
components, namely, an encoder and a decoder. An encoder
(sketch generation algorithm) accepts the original biometric
template w as input and gives a sketch (extra information)
s as output. The encoder (biometric template reconstruction
algorithm) accepts a live biometric template w′ and the sketch
s as input and generates w only if w and w′ are sufficiently
close to each other according to some similarity measure.
Fig. 17: (a) Secure sketch : On input w, a procedure outputs a sketch
s. Then, given s and a value w′ close to w, it is possible to recover
w. (b) Fuzzy extractor : It extracts a uniformly random string R from
its input w in a noise-tolerant way. Noise tolerance means that if the
input changes to some w′ but remains close, the string R can be
reproduced exactly [70].
The fuzzy extractors allow one to extract some randomness
R (using generation procedure Gen) from w and then success-
fully reproduce R (using reproduction procedure Rep) from
any string w′ that is close to w [70]. For an efficient fuzzy
extractor, the procedures Gen and Rep must run in expected
polynomial time.
Key-release scheme: In a key release mode, biometrics plays
a predetermined role in a cryptosystem, and the key would be
released to users only if biometric matching is successful [82].
The user authentication process is completely decoupled from
the key release operation.
Fig. 18 shows the key release scheme of biometric template
protection. In such systems, a cryptographic key is stored as
part of a users database record, together with the user name,
biometric template, access privileges etc., that is only released
upon a successful biometric authentication [83]. The system
using key release scheme, uses local storage of the biometric
Fig. 18: Key release scheme : In the fingerprint-based authentication,
a cryptographic key is the “secret” and fingerprint is the “key” and
the cryptographic key is released upon a successful authentication.
[2].
system, such as smart card, which raises issue about stealing
user biometrics. Moreover, these systems are also vulnerable to
Trojan horse attack at the decision module. Such an attack will
bypass all system components and inject 1-bit accept/reject
decision code into the system decision module.
2) Feature transformations: In the feature transformation
based approach, a transformation function is applied to the
template, and the output transformed template is stored in the
database. There are various transformation functions available
in the literature, e.g. cancelable biometric [84], biohashing
[73], biometric salting [44], MRP (Multispace Random Pro-
jection) [85] etc. Some of them are discussed below.
Cancelable biometrics: The non-invertible transformation
schemes, such as the cancelable biometrics apply a one-way
function1 to the template rendering it computationally hard for
the adversary to invert the template. The cancelable biometrics
on large fingerprint database was demonstrated by Ratha et al.
in [84]. Their results proved that a large number of cancelable
fingerprint transformations could be constructed without losing
much accuracy of the biometric system. Cancelable biomet-
rics consist of intentional, repeatable distortions of biometric
signals based on transforms which provide a comparison of
biometric templates in the transformed domain [9]. Jin et
al. [86] proposed an error-correction code (ECC) free key
binding scheme along with cancelable transform for minutia-
based fingerprint biometrics. The analysis done by Nagar
et al. demonstrates that cancelable fingerprint templates are
vulnerable to intrusion and (template) linkage attacks because
it is relatively easy to obtain a pre-image of the transformed
template [87].
Biometric salting is a template protection approach in which
the biometric features are transformed using a function defined
by a user-specific key or password [44]. Biometric salting
usually denotes transformations of biometric templates, which
are chosen to be invertible [61]. The adversary can recover
the original template if he accesses the key and the template.
Therefore, security of salting-based approach depends on the
secrecy of the key and the template. The key must be secret
in private domain, and must be used for every authentication
attempt.
Biohashing, applied to fingerprint biometric, is a two factor
authentication approach that combines fingerprint feature with
a user specified key/token and generates a unique compact
1a function f (x) is said to be a one-way function if it is hard to invert,
i.e., given a value y, it is computationally infeasible to find some input x such
that f (x) = y
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code per person [73]. It is a product of the biometric feature of
an individual (such as a fingerprint) with a tokenized pseudo-
random number that generates a set of user-specific secret code
called as biohash.
Fig. 19: BioHashing : Two factor authentication - secret key and
biometric data [73]
Fig. 19 shows the generation of a biohash with the help
of a user’s secret information (e.g. secret key or token)
and his biometric data, such as fingerprint. An integrated
wavelet and FourierMellin transform (WFMT) is used to create
the biometric features since, in WFMT framework, wavelet
transform preserves the local edges and noise reduction in
the low-frequency domain (high energy compacted) after the
image decomposition. This renders the fingerprint images less
sensitive to shape distortion. The analysis done by Nagar et
al. in [87] indicates that biohashing is vulnerable to intrusion
and (template) linkage attacks because it is relatively easy to
obtain a close approximation of the original template.
Multispace Random Projection (MRP) : Teoh et al. [85]
proposed a generic cancelable biometrics formulation (coined
as MRPs), which is a two-factor cancelable formulation, where
the biometric data is distorted in a revocable but non-reversible
manner by first transforming the raw biometric data into a
fixed-length feature vector. Subsequently, the feature vector
is projected onto a sequence of random subspaces that were
derived from a user-specific pseudo-random number (PRN).
The raw biometric data is transformed into a fixed-length
feature vector, and then the non-invertible random subspace
projection is performed on it to carryout MRP. A token or
a centered database stores the user-specific seeded pseudo-
random number generator. The independent, zero-mean, and
unit-variance Gaussian-distributed random bases generated
from PRN generators constitutes the random subspace. MRP
can be revoked through the pseudo-random numbers replace-
ment, so that a new template can be generated instantly, and
its non-invertible property helps to preserve the privacy of the
user biometrics data [85].
Robust hashing : Robust hashing is a secure biometric based
authentication scheme which employs a user-dependant one-
way transformation combined with a secure hashing algorithm
[88]. The robust hashing function ensures the security and
privacy of biometric data, since it is designed as a sum of
properly weighted and shifted Gaussian functions. Prelimi-
nary results show that proposed scheme offers a simple and
practical solution to one of the privacy and security weakness
of biometrics-based authentication systems namely, template
security [88].
BioPhasoring : BioPhasor, a generic cancelable biomet-
rics formulation, is a set of binary codes based on iterated
mixing between the user-specific tokenized pseudo-random
number and the biometric feature that enables straightforward
revocation of biometric template via token replacement [89].
Whenever a genuine token is used, BioPhasor offers high
accuracy during verification. As it is a general framework,
different biometrics, such as fingerprint, face, and iris, can
be secured using BioPhasor approach. Due to the highly
stable binary representation in BioPhasor, it can be easily
incorporated into biometric encryption techniques.
Non-invertible transforms : There is a significant intra-
class variation in the fingerprint representations; multiple
acquisitions of the same finger lead to different number
of minutia as well as their position (x, y) and orienta-
tion (θ), due to which it becomes difficult to match fin-
gerprints in encrypted domain [90]. A minutia based fin-
gerprint template T consists of n minutia points such
that, T = {(x1, y1, θ1) , (x2, y2, θ2) , · · · , (xn, yn, θn)}, where
(x, y) represents the position of each minutia and (θ) is
its orientation. The transformation function, φ (·), trans-
forms T into a new set of n minutia, i.e., φ (T ) =
{(x′1, y′1, θ′1) , (x′2, y′2, θ′2) , · · · , (x′n, y′n, θ′n)}. Thus, a measure
of non-invertibility estimates the difficulty in obtaining T
given φ (T ) [90].
Cartesian and polar transformation : In the Cartesian trans-
formation, the minutiae positions are measured in rectangular
coordinates with reference to the position of the singular
point, where the x-axis is aligned with the orientation of the
singular point [91]. The coordinate system is divided into
fixed sized cells numbered in a fixed sequence. The Cartesian
transformation changes the initial cell positions (with rotation
in multiple of 90◦ after transposition. In polar transformation,
the minutiae positions are measured in polar coordinates with
reference to the core position [91]. The orientation of the
core in the fingerprint is used as reference to measure the
angle. In this case, the coordinate space is divided into polar
sectors (L levels and S angles) numbered in sequence. The
transformation changes the initial sector positions along with
changing the minutia angles in accordance to the difference in
the sector positions before and after transformation. Ahmad et
al. [92] proposed a local feature-based, and Cartesian and polar
transformation-based cancelable fingerprint template scheme.
Surface folding : In a surface folding transformation, both
the position and the orientation of the minutia are changed by
a mapping function [2]. Conceptually, in this transformation
the minutia are embedded in a sheet and then the sheet is
crumpled.
Fig. 20 shows the surface folding transformation. It is
observed that the transform is smooth locally, but not globally.
Also, the transform has “folds”, i.e., multiple minutia location
in the original space map to same location in the transformed
space. This property provides the desired non-invertibility as
it creates ambiguity while reversing the transform. However,
due to fairly low “degree of folding” (after the transformation
only 8% minutia have their neighbors perturbed) the non-
invertibility provided by functional surface folding transform
is not strong in spite of high matching accuracy.
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Fig. 20: Surface folding transformation [2]
Block permutations : Block permutation is a non-invertible
transformation technique for cancelable biometric system. This
involves the process of splitting the entire image output by
the biometric sensor, into several smaller blocks which are
shuffled based on a key value, such that the entire input
image becomes chaotic [93]. The application of this technique
to fingerprint biometric system involves the division of the
original fingerprint minutia image into several blocks. A user
secret key is used to shuffle these blocks in random order so
that the real minutia positions are not revealed to the adversary.
Biotokens : Fig. 21 shows the basic operation mode of
biotokens. Initially, the scaling and translation transformation
is applied to each measured biometric feature v to produce
v′ = (v − t) · s. The transformed features are then split into a
stable part g (an integer) and an unstable part r. The first part
of the secure biometric template, w, is a one-way transform
of g. The unencoded r obscured by the transform along with
s and t form the second part of the template.
Fig. 21: Biotokens: basic operation mode [61]
In authentication, features are transformed by applying s
and t onto a residual region defined by r and the unencrypted
r is used to compute the local distance within a “window”,
which is referred to as robust distance measure, to provide
a perfect match of w [61]. Scheirer et al. introduced bipar-
tite biotoken a secure template construct for cryptographic
transactions supporting biometrics that, when re-encoded, can
release session specific data in [94]. The authors showed that
bipartite biotokens offer a convenient enhancement to keys and
passwords, allowing for tighter auditing and non-repudiation,
as well as protection from phishing and man-in-the-middle
attacks [95].
BioConvolving : Maiorana et al. introduced a novel non-
invertible transform-based approach, namely, BioConvolving,
which provides both protection and renewability for any
biometric template [96]. The transform can be expressed in
terms of a set of discrete sequences related to the temporal,
spatial, or spectral behavior of the considered biometrics. The
BioConvolving approach is characterized by three types of
transformations which, when applied to an original biometric
template, RF with F sequences r(i) [n], of length N , can
generate a secure template TF composed by F functions
f(i) [n] , i = 1, 2, ..., F , from which retrieving the original
data is as hard as randomly guessing them [97]. The security
of the BioConvolving approach depends on the fact that,
if an impostor gains access to the stored information, he
has to resolve a blind deconvolution problem to retrieve
the original template [98]. The advantage of BioConvolving
scheme is that it is not feasible for the adversary to retrieve
the original template even if he succeeds in stealing more than
one transformed template. However, the primary drawback of
the BioConvolving cancelable transformation system was the
length of its transformed template, which does not have the
same length as the original one [99].
Fingerprint shell : Moujahdi et al. exploits the informa-
tion provided by the extracted minutiae to construct a new
representation based on special spiral curves (that will be
stored in the database as template). The representation can
be used for the recognition task instead of the traditional
minutiae-based representation in [100]. Initially, the minutia
and singular points (such as, core and delta) are extracted
from the fingerprint image. The distance between each minutia
and every core and delta point is calculated. These distances
are arranged in ascending order. These distances form the
hypotenuses of several right angle triangles constructed in
the next step. The algorithm keeps only the spiral curves
thus formed for matching in the authentication phase. The
authors demonstrated that the fingerprint shell is invulnerable
to brute force attack and zero-effort attack. The limitations
of this approach include a drastic variation in the constructed
curve due to the addition of spurious minutia or missing of
majority of minutia. Due to this limitation, the fingerprint shell
is not efficient enough to be used in biometric acquisition in
all scenarios.
3) Template image transformation: While biometric tech-
niques have inherent advantages over traditional personal
identification techniques, the problem of ensuring the security
and integrity of the biometric data is critical, e.g. if a persons
biometric data (such as, her fingerprint image) is stolen, it is
not possible to replace it unlike replacing a stolen credit card,
ID, or password [101]. Encryption, steganography, watermark-
ing and visual cryptography are possible solutions to enhance
the security and integrity of biometric data.
Steganography: Steganography communicates secret in-
formation by hiding it in multimedia carrier such as im-
age/video/audio files [54]. A novel and efficient informa-
tion security system to protect biometric signatures from
any unauthorized access which employs orthogonal coding
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scheme, encoded steganography, and nonlinear encryption
scheme involving joint transform correlation is proposed in
[102]. The technique employs orthogonal coding scheme to
encode multiple biometric information and multiplex together
which makes it almost impossible to decode even a part of the
secret information without authorization [102].
Watermarking: Ratha et al. [103] described a robust data-
hiding algorithm in the wavelet-compressed domain for finger-
print images which is simple and can be easily implemented
in hardware. The approach provides security against replay
attack for an on-line fingerprint authentication system. In this
method, a different verification string is issued by the service
provider (server) for each transaction. The verification string
is combined with the fingerprint image, and then the new
image is transmitted over the insecure communication channel.
The server on receiving this image back can decompress it to
verify the presence of correct string embedded in it. Thus the
replay of stored images to the matcher is prevented. Jain et al.
introduced two applications of an amplitude modulation-based
watermarking (hiding a users biometric data in a variety of
images) method which has the ability to increase the security
of both the hidden biometric data (e.g., eigen-face coefficients)
and host images (e.g., fingerprints) [101]. The authors claimed
that a high accuracy in verification on watermarked (e.g.,
fingerprint) images is guaranteed by the feature analysis of
the host images.
Visual Cryptography Scheme (VCS): Naor et al. intro-
duced a cryptographic scheme, visual cryptography, which
is perfectly secure, very easy to implement and can decode
concealed images without any cryptographic computations
in [104]. VCS is a cryptographic technique that allows for
the encryption of visual information such that the decryption
can be performed using the human visual system [105]. The
basic VCS scheme is denoted as (k, n) VCS, and read as
k − out − of − n VCS. Suppose T is the original binary
image, the scheme encrypts it in n images such that,
T = Sh1 ⊕ Sh2 ⊕ Sh3 · · · ⊕ Shk (5)
where ⊕ is a Boolean operation and Shi is an image that
appears as white noise, such that, hi ∈ (1, 2, 3, · · · , k), k ≤ n
and n specifies the number of noisy images. The encryption is
undertaken in such a way that k or more out of the n generated
images are necessary for reconstructing the original image T
and it is difficult to decipher the secret image using individual
Shis [105].
C. Secure Multiparty Computation (SMPC)
The Secure Multiparty Computation technique is useful in
a system composed of n entities, namely e1, e2, ..., en. All
entities jointly compute a public function g using individual
secret data, s1, s2, ..., sn, keeping their private inputs undis-
closed from each other.
Homomorphic Encryption (HE): Gomez-Barrero et al. pro-
posed a new efficient biometric template protection scheme
based on homomorphic probabilistic encryption for fixed-
length templates, where only encrypted data is processed
[106]. Homomorphic Encryption schemes require no auxiliary
data (which can be exploited in order to obtain information
about the hidden biometric data, thus violating the privacy
of the subject) and allow for computations to be performed
on ciphertexts, which generate encrypted results whose corre-
sponding plaintexts match the results of the operations carried
out on the original plaintext [106]. Most HE schemes rely
on asymmetric cryptography, and the homomorphic property
holds under encryption with the public key of one of the parties
involved in the protocol [107].
In an honest-but-curious adversary model [108], where both
parties, client and server, follow the established protocols but
may try to learn additional information about the other side
template, the server must process the clients biometric data
without extracting any information from it, and at the same
time, the server must protect the information stored in the
database [107]. To achieve this, the Paillier homomorphic
probabilistic encryption scheme [109] is used, which is based
on the decisional composite residuosity assumption: given a
composite n and an integer z, it is hard to decide whether z
is an n-residue modulo n2.
Oblivious Transfer (OT): Oblivious transfer is a secure two-
party computation (STPC) protocol which enables one party,
say the sender (e.g. a server) S, to send one out of n messages
(x1, x2, ..., xn) to a receiver (say, a client) R. The receiver
initially chooses any of the n messages. The communication
completes without the receiver revealing any information about
the chosen xi to the sender and also the information about the
remaining n − 1 messages is kept hidden from the receiver.
If we consider the elements to be the stored (encrypted)
biometric templates, we see that OT essentially allows one
to search in the database, without revealing which item (i.e.,
biometric template) is selected for the matching process [110].
OT alone cannot prevent some template recovery attacks, since
the best known strategy is based solely on the value returned
by the (Biometric Authentication System) BAS (essentially the
acceptance/rejection message) which is not affected by the OT
technique [110]. Hamming distance together with oblivious
transfers is one of the most elegant tools used in biometric
authentication systems [111].
Garbled Circuits (GC): Garbled circuits are a cryptographic
technique (combining OT and SMPC between two entities)
that enables two parties to compute a function (represented
as a binary circuit) and learn only the output of the function
and nothing else (e.g., the other partys input) and thus is quite
relevant for achieving a privacy-preserving matching process
in biometric authentication [110]. Given that the complexity
depends on the number of gates composing the circuit, GCs
are suited for operations such as sums and comparisons, for
which the number of gates depends linearly on the input bit
length [107].
Dodis et al. coined the terms secure sketch and fuzzy
extractor in the context of key generation from biometric
data [70]. The general idea of fuzzy extractor is based on a
two-step process, where an extraction function first transforms
any sufficiently random fuzzy secret into an almost uniform
random private string, and outputs some public information,
which is used in the regeneration step to reconstitute the exact
same private string from a close enough approximation of the
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original fuzzy secret [112].
Umut Uludag et al. [83] have presented various methods
that monolithically bind a cryptographic key with the user’s
stored biometric template in such a way that the key cannot
be revealed without a successful biometric authentication.
In [62], the authors have proposed an effective biometric
cryptosystem construction for biometric template protection
using a number of discretized fingerprint texture descriptors
and appropriate error correcting codes (ECC). Jo et al. have
proposed a biometric digital key generation/extraction mecha-
nisms for cryptographic secure communication [113]. Arjona
et al. provided the implementation of a fingerprint biometric
cryptosystem in FPGA [114].
A novel algorithm for fingerprint encryption which trans-
forms fingerprint minutia and performs matching in the trans-
formed form was proposed in [115]. This algorithm con-
structs a circular region around each minutia and encrypts
these regions before storing as “canceled template” in the
database. Considering their results, the authors claim to have
achieved improvement in accuracy compared to fuzzy vault
system. Benjamin Tams investigated the implementations of
biometric cryptosystems for protecting fingerprint templates
and concluded that a single fingerprint is insufficient to provide
a secure biometric cryptosystem in [48].
The biometric data can be secured using encryption tech-
niques, watermarking, and steganography. The use of an
amplitude modulation-based watermarking method to hide a
users biometric data in a variety of images so as to increase
the security of both the hidden biometric data and host
images (e.g., fingerprints) was proposed in [101]. The hashing
technique can also be used to secure biometric data. A method
hashing fingerprint minutia information, wherein only hashed
data is transmitted and stored in the server database, and it
is not possible to restore fingerprint minutia locations using
hashed data in [116].
VII. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
The fingerprint biometric system is widely used in bor-
der control, forensics, criminal identification, access control,
computer logins, e-commerce, welfare disbursements, missing
children identification, id-cards, passports, user authentication
on mobile devices, time and attendance monitoring systems
[117]. Due to the wide acceptance of the biometric system as
a reliable means for user identification and authorization, it
becomes a need to address various challenges for improving
the system performance and enhance the security of such sys-
tems. Jain et al. have categorized the fundamental barriers in
biometrics into four main categories, namely, accuracy, scale,
security, and privacy in [118]. The accuracy of a biometric
system is highly influenced by false-match and false-nonmatch
errors in making the correct decision. The scale barrier poses
a question about the effect of the number of enrolled users
in making a correct decision. The security of the biometric
system against possible attacks and the privacy of user data is
of paramount importance.
The future of biometric system along with various research
opportunities are discussed in [119]. The authors have ad-
dressed opportunities in modality-related research, information
security research, testing and evaluation research, systems-
level statistical engineering research, research on scale and
social science. The privacy issues related to biometric system
are discussed in [22]. The privacy issues are mainly related
to user data (i.e. biometrics). Privacy concerns arise when
biometric data are used for secondary purposes, invoking
function creep, data matching, aggregation, surveillance and
profiling [120]. To address the privacy issue of an individual’s
biometrics, a fingerprint authentication system for the privacy
protection of the fingerprint template stored in a database is
introduced in [34]. In this case, the identity of an individual
is hidden in a thinned fingerprint template, which is stored
in an online database and retrieved in authentication phase.
Some people do not believe in the biometric system due to
privacy concerns. Hence, the research community is facing a
challenge to develop a biometric system which takes care of
not only the security but also the privacy of the user data.
The World Bank estimates that more than 1.5 billion people
worldwide do not officially exist [121]. Biometric system can
be the possible solution to this global issue of rendering the
resources and services of the government accessible to the
people.
Akhtar et al. have performed a comprehensive study on
biometric systems and tried to answer some of key questions
related to biometrics in [40]. The authors have categorised
the queries into various sections, such as the current status
of biometrics, current issues and challenges of biometrics,
hot topics in biometrics, security of biometrics and future of
biometrics.
VIII. OPEN PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES
The biometric systems are improving every day making our
lives better and secure. In this Section, we identify present
limitations, open problems, and future research opportunities
in biometric systems. Table III shows the topics in biometrics
that still need attention from industry and academia.
Smartphone biometrics is the use of biometrics to secure
a smartphone from unauthorized access and theft. At present
more than 95% of world population is using a smartphone.
The use of fingerprint, iris, and face as owner identification is
already available with some smartphones. The time required
for authentication using biometrics is relatively high, and with
multi-factor authentication, such as password and biometrics,
things are getting worse for the user. A hardware-level match-
ing can improve the execution time of such systems.
Big data techniques for biometrics is required for an
extensive template database such as Aadhaar database or
a global passport validation with user biometrics. The big
data techniques work at data storage, data analytics, efficient
searching, and data privacy. These techniques can be a possible
solution to a sufficiently sizeable biometric template database.
Biometric sensor interoperability is the adaption of a bio-
metric system to the raw biometrics obtained from the sensors
of another biometric system. The biometric systems are tuned
to accept the biometrics generated from a single sensor.
Hence, they show an abnormal response to the biometrics not
produced from its sensors. This issue can be addressed at a
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TABLE III: Opportunities in fingerprint biometric system
Topic Issues / research opportunities
Smartphone
biometrics
Improving matching speed and addressing
template security on smartphone
Big data
techniques Securing database against template leakage
Biometric sensor
interoperability Sensor technology enhancement
Wearable
biometrics Addressing privacy issues
Performance
improvement
Improving matching speed, narrowing
zero-effort attacks
Sensor technology
enhancement
Improving the sensor speed and making them
invulnerable to presentation attacks
Poor quality image
recognition
Improving the digital image processing
techniques
Biometrics on
smartcard
Issues related to tampering attack and
a side-channel attack on this system
Fingerprint
indexing Designing techniques for database indexing
Biometric
cryptosystems
Performance enhancement using hardware based
multimodal biometric cryptosystem
Touchless
biometric Touchless biometric system using multiple traits
Cancelable
biometrics
Cancelable template generation for multimodal
biometric systems
2D-3D
biometrics
Develop improved image processing techniques
to transform 2D biometrics into 3D
Multimodal
biometric system
Issues in design, testing, accuracy,
and performance of such systems
Biometrics as
digital signature
Mitigating the hill-climbing attack and issues
related to practicable biometric digital signature
level that a capacitive sensor accepts the biometrics obtained
from any other capacitive sensor.
Wearable biometrics refers to person identification technol-
ogy incorporated into items of garments and accessories that
can read, record, and compare individuals biometric traits such
as heart rate, respiratory rate, or any physical activity [122].
The devices embedded into daily wearables such as a watch,
jewelry, shoes, spectacles, handbags, clothing, etc. provide
continuous interaction with the biometric system without user
knowledge and intervention. Wearable biometric is the future
of user identification. An improvement in sensor technology,
such as sound sensor, location sensor, light sensor, temper-
ature sensor etc., and wireless communication protocol is
required for wearable biometrics. Biometric signals should be
distinguishable, permanent, collectable, and difficult to imitate
[122].
Performance improvement in biometric system deals with
the matching time during the authentication phase. The
chances of zero-effort attack should be narrowed down, and at
the same time, the user identification and authentication must
happen in no time since the biometric submission. To address
this problem, we need to revisit the system in its entirety and
preserve the security of the system. The biometric input device
can be designed to capture multiple fingerprint images and
keep the best quality image to improve matching accuracy
and minimize the possibility of zero-effort attack. Based on
the images captured in the enrollment phase, the predefined
threshold should be automatically adjusted for every user, and
this user-specific threshold should be used in authentication
phase.
Sensor technology enhancement needs to be addressed for
detecting and preventing all kinds of fake biometric submis-
sion incidents at the sensor level itself. The sensor should
be able to sense the physical presence of a user when the
biometrics is submitted. An improvement in sensor technology
can reduce the probabilities of false acceptance and false
rejection.
Poor quality image recognition is required since the human
and environmental factors affect the way sensor captures the
biometrics of an individual. The image enhancement module
should be able to make a poorly captured image recogniz-
able by the matcher against the stored template. The image
processing techniques can solve this problem.
Biometrics on smartcard is already in use, such as Match-
on-card and Match-in-sensor wherein the biometric is stored
in the smartcard and a one-to-one matching is performed in the
authentication mode. The template security and performance
of this system have to be evaluated and improved.
Fingerprint indexing is the organization of fingerprint tem-
plates stored in the database. The linear search performed on
entire database results in a large search space and thus requires
O
(
n
)
comparisons in the worst case for n templates in the
database. A relatively less number of worst case comparisons
can reduce the search time and ultimately improve the overall
performance of the system.
Biometric cryptosystems based on a single finger cannot
provide significant security since it is susceptible to brute
force attack and zero-effort attack, i.e., false acceptance.
Also, the biometric cryptosystem is found to be relatively
slow as compared to the cancelable biometrics. A hardware-
based biometric cryptosystem with multi-modal biometric can
address this problem.
Touchless biometric system senses the biometrics of an
individual with physical contact with the sensor. A palm print
based touchless biometric system is available as a commercial
product. A multimodal touchless biometric system can effi-
ciently enhance the security of such systems.
Cancelable biometrics using multiple traits can make the
template more secure and irreversible. The combination of
cancelable biometric with biometric encryption techniques is
a topic to look forward to research for solving the problem of
stolen biometrics.
2D-3D biometrics is the transformation of the 2D biometric
image into a 3D image to be used for enrollment and authen-
tication. The image processing techniques that help in such
transformation can explore new horizon.
Multimodal biometric system using more than one trait to
enroll and authorize an individual is gaining more attention
by the research community. The performance and security of
such system have a vast scope in contributing to biometric
system future.
Biometrics as digital signature It is desirable to generate a
digital signature using biometrics but not practicable because
of its inaccurate measuring and potential hill-climbing attacks,
without using specific hardware devices that hold signature
keys or biometric templates securely [123].
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IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have done a comprehensive study of
the fingerprint biometric system and addressed various secu-
rity aspects of the system. The security vulnerabilities of a
biometric system were highlighted using threat models. The
direct, indirect and side channel attacks targeting biometric
system were elaborated to understand the weaknesses in
the system. The application of cryptographic techniques in
securing biometric system termed as biometric cryptosystem
and cancelable biometrics has contributed significantly to the
template protection techniques. We have identified some of the
open problems and challenges that need to be addressed by
the researchers. The biometric security has a lot of scopes to
make further the system more invulnerable to different types
of attacks. We mainly focused on including the topics related
to the biometric system that is sufficient enough to build a
base for the reader and encourage them to further explore and
contribute in the field of biometric security.
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